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Technology Shocks in Multi-Sided Markets: The Impact of Craigslist on 
Local Newspapers 
 
Abstract 
 
Theories of multi-sided markets suggest that a platform’s pricing strategies on different 
sides of the market are closely linked, and in particular, an increase in competition on one 
side may lead to an increase in price on other sides. We empirically examine platforms’ 
pricing strategies by exploiting the gradual expansion of Craigslist, a website providing 
classified ads services, into local newspaper markets. We adopt a differences-in-differences 
approach by comparing the pricing strategies of local newspapers for which classified ads 
are likely to be a significant portion of their revenue to others before and after Craigslist’s 
entry. We find that these newspapers drop their classified ad rates significantly more after 
Craigslist’s entry.  We also find that the impact of the entry of Craigslist propagates to other 
sides of the newspaper market. These newspapers increase their subscription rates 
relative to others, and consequently, their circulation also drops more. Finally, lower 
circulation also leads to lower display ad rates for these newspapers. Our study helps build 
an understanding of how incumbent media platforms respond to technologically disruptive 
entrants in multi-sided markets.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Many markets in today's economy are multi-sided. In these markets, an 
intermediary, often referred to as a “platform,” provides a product or a service to two or 
more sides of the market, and the utility that agents on each side of the market derive from 
accessing the platform depends on other sides of the market (e.g., Rochet and Tirole, 2003; 
Caillaud and Jullien, 2003; Armstrong, 2005; Katsamakas and Economides, 2006). 
Examples of such platforms include payment cards (card holders and merchants), 
newspapers (subscribers, classified advertisers, and display advertisers1), media players 
(content providers and users), dating clubs (men and women), and sponsored search 
engines (users and advertisers). Because of the interdependency across different sides of 
the market, a platform’s pricing strategies to each side are often closely linked. Studies on 
markets with two sides have shown that a platform often subsidizes one side and makes 
money from the other side. For example, newspapers often subsidize readers and make 
money out of advertisers and video game manufacturers frequently sell their consoles 
below manufacturing cost and charge game publishers royalties.  
Recent studies extend this line of work to examine how platforms adjust their prices 
in response to competition. In general, theoretical studies of markets with two sides have 
found that when the competition on one side of the market becomes more intense, the 
price on the other side may increase. For example, Hagiu (2009) studies how competition 
between producers on one side of the market can reduce the need for the platform to 
reduce prices to consumers on the other side of the market. In a similar vein, Godes, Ofek 
                                                 
1 Display ads are used by businesses to promote their products and services and are displayed alongside 
regular editorial content. In contrast, classified ads typically have a separate section. 
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and Sarvary (2009) find that media platforms may charge higher content prices in a 
duopoly than in a monopoly. These results share a similar intuition. For example, in the 
case of media platforms, if a new platform enters a market and the number of advertisers 
remain fixed, the number of advertisers available to any incumbent platforms drops.  Since 
part of the value of attracting consumers is that it allows the platform to raise price to 
advertisers, the return per customer decreases as the number of advertisers goes down, 
making these platforms less willing to under-price content to increase demand. These 
findings are in sharp contrast to those in a regular one-sided market where competition 
typically lowers prices.  Anecdotal evidence supports these theoretical predictions. For 
example, most newspaper websites in the 1990s offered their content away for free and 
financed themselves exclusively by advertising revenues. As the number of online content 
sites increased, many newspapers such as the New York Times decided to switch to 
subscription-based business models (Casadesus-Masanell and Zhu 2010).2   
We empirically test these theoretical predictions by studying how local newspapers 
respond to changes in the intensity of competition in one of their markets.  We accomplish 
this by exploiting the geographic and temporal expansion of Craigslist, a website providing 
classified ads services, into local newspaper markets. Craigslist offers classified ads for free 
in most cases.3  In addition, ads on Craigslist are easy to search, and are updated in real 
time, unlike a newspaper. Because of the competition for classified advertisers, we expect 
the number of classified advertisers for newspapers to decrease significantly after 
Craigslist’s entry. We adopt a differences-in-differences approach that compares the 
                                                 
2 See http://paidcontent.org/article/419-taking-the-plunge-how-newspaper-sites-that-charge-are-faring/ for 
a partial list of newspaper sites charging fees to readers.  
3 Craigslist charges for job listings in a small number of cities, and for apartment listings in New York City. 
Source: http://www. craigslist.org/about/factsheet, accessed May 2010. 
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pricing strategies of local newspapers for which classified ads are likely to be a significant 
fraction of their revenue to others before and after the entry of Craigslist.  We identify such 
newspapers by whether or not the newspaper has a classified ad editor.  We find that these 
newspapers drop their classified ad rates significantly more post-entry.  We next examine 
how Craigslist entry to the classified ad market impacts the other sides of the newspaper 
market: the subscriber side and the display advertiser side. Consistent with theoretical 
predictions, newspapers with classified editors increase their subscription rates relative to 
others. Because of this increase in subscription rates, their circulation also drops more. 
Finally, the lower circulation makes these newspapers less attractive to display advertisers, 
leading to lower display ad rates.  
Several other papers empirically evaluate multi-sided markets. Gandal, Kende and 
Rob (2000), Nair, Chintagunta and Dubé (2004), Clements and Ohashi (2005) and Rysman 
(2007) quantify the strength of indirect network effects in DVD, personal digital assistant , 
video game and payment card market, respectively. Derdenger (2010), Lee (2010) and 
Corts and Lederman (2009) evaluate exclusive contracting in the video-game market. 
Cantillon and Yin (2008) study tipping in financial exchanges.  Genakos and Valletti (2007) 
show that lower call termination revenue for cellular phone providers as a result of 
government regulations leads to higher fees to subscribers.  In the context of the media 
markets, Rysman (2004) quantifies indirect network effects for Yellow Pages, where 
platforms charge only the advertisers and readers get the products for free. Kaiser and 
Wright (2006) and Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2007) study pricing in the German magazine 
market and the Italian newspaper market, respectively, and find that media platforms are 
likely to subsidize the consumer side using revenues from the advertiser side because of 
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indirect network effects. Chandra and Collard-Wexler (2009) study Canadian newspaper 
mergers and show that increased concentration in two-sided markets need not lead to 
higher prices. A few studies show that newspapers may reposition themselves as 
competition increases. For example, George and Waldfogel (2006) show that increased 
competition from the New York Times leads local papers to shift away from national or 
foreign news, areas in which the New York Times has a comparative advantage, to more 
local news stories. Chandra (2009) shows that competition may lead newspapers to do 
better targeting, allowing the newspaper to raise prices to advertisers. Our study of 
Craigslist’s entry differs from other newspaper studies in that competition is intensified 
mostly on the classified ad side of the market as Craigslist does not provide any content.  
Moreover, Craigslist’s entry asymmetrically impacts newspapers with greater reliance on 
revenue from classified ads.4    
Of the existing empirical work, our paper most closely resembles recent work by Jin 
and Rysman (2010) and Kroft and Pope (2008).  Jin and Rysman (2010) study sportcards 
conventions to show that prices to consumers rise and prices to dealers drop as 
competition between platforms (the conventions) increases.  Their paper uses variation in 
geographic distance between conventions to infer asymmetric degree of competition for 
consumers and dealers.  Our paper finds similar results – that prices fall on one side of the 
platform and rise on another side following an increase in competition – but extended to a 
three-sided market setting.  In addition, we take advantage of panel data on newspaper 
characteristics as well as Craigslist’s geographical and temporal entry patterns to employ a 
                                                 
4 Arguably, many of the newspaper’s subscribers read the newspaper for news and editorial content, in 
addition to searching classified ads.   On the other side of the market, however, classified advertisers are 
really only interested in the rates newspapers charge, and compare this price to alternatives (such as the zero 
price charged by Craigslist). 
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differences-in-differences research design.  The research design’s focus on Craigslist is 
similar to a paper by Kroft and Pope (2008) which studies the effect of Craigslist’s 
expansion on rental vacancy rates and unemployment rates.  Unlike Kroft and Pope, our 
study focuses on outcomes for newspaper firms rather than outcomes for the population 
that uses either type of platform. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents background 
information on Craigslist. Section 3 presents a simple model to illustrate the impact of  
Craigslist’s entry. Section 4 presents our empirical analysis. We conclude in Section 5.   
2. Craigslist's Expansion 
 
Craigslist is a website that specializes in online classified listings. It began the 
service in 1995 as an email distribution list of friends in the San Francisco Bay Area, before 
becoming a web-based service in 1996. Craigslist expanded into 9 more U.S. cities in 2000, 
4 in 2001 and 2002 each, 14 in 2003, and many more cities in recent years. It selects cities 
based on user requests. As of 2010, Craigslist is available for more than 700 local sites in 70 
countries.5 The site serves over twenty billion page views per month, and is the 7th most 
visited web site in the United States.6 With over fifty million new classified advertisements 
each month7 and about sixty million unique visitors in the US each month8, Craigslist is the 
leading classifieds service in any medium. As revenues from classified ads account for 40% 
                                                 
5 http://www. craigslist.org/about/factsheet, accessed July 2010. 
6 http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/craigslist.org, accessed July 2010. 
7 http://www. craigslist.org/about/factsheet, accessed July 2010.  
8 http://siteanalytics.compete.com/craigslist.org/, accessed July 2010. 
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of a newspaper’s total revenues on average,9  the introduction of Craigslist into a 
newspaper’s local market has the potential to be incredibly disruptive, leading to an almost 
immediate drop in a large portion of revenue. Indeed, Craigslist has been criticized for 
stealing a massive chunk of the classified market from established  local newspapers, and is 
frequently referred as a “newspaper killer.”10   
Our empirical setting has several advantages in testing platforms’ pricing behavior. 
The theoretical result that price on one side of a two-sided market increases is contingent 
on the condition that the competition increases more significantly on the other side. In our 
setting, we expect to see significant increase in competition on the classified ad side 
relative to the subscriber side. Hence, our setting is ideal for testing the direction of price 
changes.  
Second, one of the empirical challenges of studying multi-sided markets is collecting 
price data on all sides of the market. For example, video games are a canonical example of a 
two-sided market, but researchers do not observe the contractual agreement on ies 
between console providers and game publishers. In the newspaper market, while the 
market is three-sided, we are able to collect prices on all three sides.  
Third, the gradual expansion of Craigslist into different regions allows us to 
establish causal relationship.  The environment is a complex one: many technological 
changes, in particular, the diffusion of the Internet, have affected the newspaper industry. 
                                                 
9 See Swarts, Will. “Craigslist: Stopping the Presses?” at Smart Money, September 7, 2005. Source: 
http://www.smartmoney.com/investing/stocks/craigslist-stopping-the-presses-18189/, accessed  
December 2009. 
10 See, for example,  http://www.sfbg.com/40/18/x_editors_notes.html, 
http://nymag.com/nymetro/news/media/internet/15500/, 
http://sfist.com/2004/12/29/craigslist_newspaper_killer.php, and 
http://www.forbes.com/2006/12/08/newspaper-classifield-online-tech_cx-lh_1211craigslist.html, accessed 
July 2010.  
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For example, websites such as eBay.com and monster.com also attract classified 
advertisers, and content sites such as blogs and Google news attract many newspaper 
readers away. Unlike Craigslist, all these sites started by serving consumers in all regions in 
the US. As a result, we are able to use year dummies and their interactions with newspaper 
types to control for their overall effects on newspapers and disproportionate effects on 
different types of newspapers.  
3. A Simple Model  
 
Here we present a simple stylized model to illustrate the impact of Craigslist’s entry. 
Our model extends Armstrong (2006) to consider three-sided interactions. Consider a 
situation where a newspaper charges a fixed fee of   to each classified advertiser,  to 
each display advertiser and p to each subscriber.  
Assume that there are m classified advertisers. Classified advertisers are identified 
by parameter   which is uniform distributed in [0, 1]. The type-  advertiser makes profit 
  when a reader of the newspaper sees its ad. Hence, if the circulation of the newspaper is 
D, only classified advertisers with type /D  will be willing to pay to advertise. Then the 
number of classified advertisers that advertise to the newspaper will be (1 / )m D  and 
(1 / )m D   is the profit from classified ads.  
The setup is similar on the side of display advertisers. Assume the size of display 
advertisers is n. We similarly obtain that the newspaper profit from display advertisers will 
be (1 / )n D  .   
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On the subscriber side, we assume that the market size is S and the demand for the 
newspaper, i.e., circulation, is (1 )D S p  . Hence, the newspaper subscription profit will 
be Dp .  
The total profit of the newspaper is  thus:  
 ( , , ) (1 / ) (1 / )p m D n D Dp           ,  
where (1 )D S p  . The newspaper maximize its profit by setting  ,   and p 
simultaneously. Taking the first order conditions with respect to  ,   and p, we have: 
 
1
(4 )
8
p m n    and 
1
(1 )
2
S p    .                                  
The equations are intuitive. As the number of potential classified advertisers or 
display advertisers increases, the newspaper is more willing to lower the subscription 
price  to increase its subscription. In addition, the classified ad rate and display ad rate 
increase as price decreases because a lower price increases subscription, making the 
newspaper more attractive to advertisers.  
We now consider the impact of Craigslist’e entry. After the entry, Craigslist attracts 
classified advertisers away and thus reduces the number of potential classified advertisers, 
m, for the newspaper. As m decreases, p increases, and  and  decrease. In addition, the 
circulation share, /D S , decreases.  
The result is consistent with findings in Godes, Ofek and Sarvary (2009) and Jin and 
Rysman (2010).  An increase in the competition in the classified ads market decreases the 
classified ad rate and thus reduces the return per reader. As a result, the newspaper has a 
lower incentive to subsidize the subscriber side. The subscription price thus increases. The 
increase in turn leads to lower circulation, making the newspaper less attractive to display 
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advertisers. Display ad rates drop as a consequence. Our results differ from the prior 
literature in that we have three sides. We find that an increase in competition on one side 
does not necessarily increase prices on other sides.  The direction of price change depends 
on the interdependency across different sides. In our case, the display ad side does not 
interact directly with the classified ad side; they are linked to each other through the 
subscriber side.     
4. Empirical Analysis 
 
4.1 Empirical Approach 
 
Our goal is to study how local newspapers respond to entry by Craigslist.  The 
empirical design relies on a differences-in-differences approach that compares prices and 
rates after craigslist’s entry to prices and rates before Craigslist’s entry for newspapers 
with a classifieds editor to those without.  The basic specification will be of the following 
form: 
  
(1) yit = β0 + β1craigslist_entryit + β2craigslist_entryit * classifiedit + β3classifiedit + Xitδ + γi + ηt 
+ εit,   
 
where yit is one of the outcome variables, such as classified rate, display advertising rate, 
subscription price or circulation share (i.e., the percentage of population subscribing to the 
newspaper), for newspaper i at time t.  The variable craigslist_entryit  is a dummy variable 
which equals one in all years after Craigslist enters the newspaper’s local market and zero 
otherwise.  We define the relevant market to be the county in which the newspaper is 
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based.  Other papers have defined the relevant market at the zip code (Chandra, 2009) or 
MSA level (George and Waldfogel, 2006).  We use county to be consistent with Craigslist’s 
product offerings, which sometimes vary by county or by state region.  For example, 
Craigslist has separate pages for La Salle County, Illinois, Fairfield County, Connecticut, 
Western Maryland and Eastern North Carolina, to name a few.  The variable classifiedit is a 
dummy indicating whether newspaper i had a classifieds editor in year t.  We use this 
variable to indicate those newspapers which rely heavily on classified ads, and hence we 
expect those newspapers to be even more affected by the entry of craigslist.  Xit is a vector of 
other market control variables, γi is a newspaper fixed effect and ηt is a year fixed effect.   
Inclusion of the newspaper fixed effect controls for any fixed differences across 
newspapers and the year dummies control for common macroeconomic shocks.  However, 
one concern would be that unobserved market level changes that are correlated with 
Craigslist entry decision are driving the newspaper’s pricing decision.  Hence, regression 
(1) includes market level controls Xit to control for factors that vary within market over 
time.  These include controls for levels of competition and changes in Internet penetration, 
and are described in more detail below.  Throughout all of our specifications the error 
terms are clustered at the level of the newspaper to account for autocorrelation in the data 
across newspapers and over time. This clustering relaxes the assumption of independence 
of the error terms of newspapers that are in close proximity to one another, and insures 
that the standard errors are not underestimated (Bertrand et al, 2007). 
An additional concern is that changes in strategy by firms such as monster.com or 
Google at the national level may affect the local newspaper’s pricing decisions.  Such 
changes may have an asymmetric effect on those newspapers which are particularly reliant 
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on classified ads for revenues.  We include the interactions between classifiedit and year 
dummies in some regressions to control for these effects.  
 One benefit of studying newspaper responses to Craigslist is that the product is very 
similar across markets in a given year.  For example, the Craigslist webpage for Atlanta in 
February 2003 is nearly identical to the Craigslist webpage for Chicago in February 2003 
(see Figures 1 and 2).  Of course, heterogeneity in population tastes or in ease of access to 
the Internet across markets means that Craigslist may be more popular in some areas than 
others.  In order to account for this, we provide robustness tests that use the number of 
posts on Craigslist, a continuous variable, in place of the dummy variable, craigslist_entryit.  
The variable num_craigslist_postsit equals zero in all years before Craigslist enters a county 
and is some positive number in all years after Craigslist enters.    
 
4.2 Data 
 
The data are combined from several sources.  Information on the date of Craigslist’s 
entry into different market is from Craigslist, with additional details on dates from older 
versions of the Craigslist website.11   
Information on each newspaper’s circulation, subscription price, display ad rate and 
positions in the advertising sales management team is from Editor & Publisher International 
Yearbooks (E&P) for years 1999, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2006 and 2008.  The yearbooks contain 
data on virtually every newspaper in the U.S. and such data are also used by the US census 
to compile summary statistics for the annual Statistical Abstract of the United States. 
Information published in these yearbooks is current as of the year prior to publication.  
                                                 
11  The company lists the dates and locations of its expansion here: http://www. 
craigslist.org/about/expansion.  From November 2006, the site only lists the number of cities entered, so we 
supplemented with information from older Craigslist websites found on the Internet Archive. 
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Information on classified ad rates is from the SRDS Newspaper Advertising Source (SRDS) 
for years 2000-2006.  SRDS does not provide the same newspaper characteristics as E&P, 
so we match newspaper characteristics from the E&P database.  Using information on the 
location of each newspaper in our sample we construct a measure of competition within 
the newspaper’s home county by counting the number of other newspapers and use this 
measure to control for changes in the newspaper’s market structure that might affect its 
pricing strategy. 
We collect information on the number of high speed internet service providers 
(ISPs) at the zip code for each year from the Federal Communications Commission.  This 
information is then averaged across all the zip codes in the county to create a variable 
representing the average number of ISPs in each county. This variable is included to control 
for diffusion of the Internet within the relevant market, which may affect newspapers’ 
strategies.  We also collect county level demographic data, including age, high school drop- 
out rate, poverty rate, population and income, from the U.S. Census Bureau.  The population 
data is used to transform the circulation variable into a share.   
We use internetarchive.org to access historical pages of Craigslist for each year of all 
of the markets in our sample, and from these pages we gather counts of the numbers of 
posts in each category.  For example, in Atlanta on February 7 under the category 
“sale/wanted” there were 302 posts listed under “general for sale” and 63 posts listed 
under “items wanted” (see Figure 1). These category counts are then aggregated up to the 
market level to create a variable number_of_postsit which we use in robustness checks.   
Over the years, Craigslist added new categories such as personals. To ensure that we can 
compare the number of posts on Craigslist in different years, we only aggregate counts in 
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four categories (community, housing, jobs and sales/wanted) that Craigslist had since its 
inception. When internetarchive.org archives the same Web page multiple times in a single 
year, we take the average of these counts. 
Table 1 provides summary statistics of variables that have been collected. We have 
different numbers of observations for these variables because our data are collected from 
several sources.  Table 2 displays the means of selected demographic variables at the 
county level broken out into those counties that experienced entry by Craigslist and those 
that did not.  Results from t-tests of the means are also displayed in this table.  Note that the 
t-tests are all insignificant, except in one case (age), suggesting that Craigslist’s entry into 
different counties is likely to be uncorrelated with the errors in regression equation (1). 
 
4.3 Results 
 
Tables 3-6 report the regression results based on equation (1).  Table 3 reports 
regression results on log classified ad rates.  All the models include newspaper and year 
fixed effects.  Model 1 includes only the dummy variable for craigslist_entryit, the coefficient 
of which is positive, but not significant, indicating that, on average, newspapers did not 
change classified ad rates following entry by Craigslist.  Model 2 adds in a dummy for 
classifiedit, an interaction between classifiedit and craigslist_entryit and the number of 
newspapers.  The coefficients on craigslist_entryit and classifiedit are positive but 
insignificant, whereas the coefficient on their interaction is negative and significant.  This 
result indicates that newspapers with classified editors were on average more likely to 
lower classified ad rates following entry by Craigslist.  Model 3 replicates Model 2 and adds 
the interactions between year dummies and classifiedit, Model 4 replicates Model 2 and 
adds the number of ISPs as another control, and Model 5 replicates Model 4 and adds the 
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interactions between year dummies and classifiedit.  The results across Models 3 – 5 are 
similar to the ones in Model 2; namely, newspapers with classified editors were on average 
more likely to lower classified ad rates following entry by Craigslist.  It is worth noting that 
while the coefficient on classifiedit * craigslist_entryit is only significant at the 10% level, the 
point estimate does not vary much across the different Models, suggesting that the 
relationship is robust.  The mean log classified ad rate is 1.1; the coefficients on classifiedit * 
craigslist_entryit are close to -0.2 suggesting close to a 20% drop in classified ad rates, on 
average, for affected newspapers. 
Tables 4 – 6 present similar Models as in Table 3, but with different dependent 
variables.  Table 4 focuses on (logged) subscription price; Table 5 focuses on circulation 
share; and Table 6 focuses on (logged) display ad rate.  In Table 4, the coefficient on 
classifiedit * craigslist_entryit is positive and significant across most specifications, indicating 
that newspapers with classified editors were on average more likely to raise price 
following entry by Craigslist.  It might seem counterintuitive that entry by a newspaper’s 
rival can lead to an increase in price.  However, this accords well with theoretical 
predictions that prices in one of the newspaper’s markets can rise when entry has an 
asymmetric competitive effect on the newspaper’s markets.   As a result of the drop in 
demand from classified advertisers, the newspaper had less incentive to continue to keep 
subscription price low.  The mean log price is 4.8; the coefficients on classifiedit * 
craigslist_entryit range between 0.02 - 0.05 across the Models, suggesting less than a 1% 
increase in subscription price, on average, for affected newspapers.   
In Table 5, the coefficient on classifiedit * craigslist_entryit is negative and significant 
across all specifications, indicating that newspapers with classified editors were on average 
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more likely to experience a decrease in circulation following entry by Craigslist.  It is 
unclear the extent to which this result is due to subscribers’ substitution away from 
newspapers to other forms of media, such as Craigslist, or due to a drop in subscribers’ 
demand following from higher prices charged by the newspaper.  The mean circulation 
share is 0.17; the coefficients on classifiedit * craigslist_entryit range between negative 0.007 
- 0.012 across the Models, suggesting a 4-7% drop in circulation share, on average, for 
affected newspapers.   
In Table 6, the coefficient on classifiedit * craigslist_entryit is negative, but only 
significant in two of the specifications, indicating that newspapers with classified editors 
were on average more likely to decrease display ad prices following entry by Craigslist.  
The mean display ad rate is 3.48; the coefficients on classifiedit * craigslist_entryit range 
between negative 0.015 - 0.041 across the Models, suggesting about a 0.5 – 1% drop in 
display ad rates, on average, for affected newspapers. 
Table 7 provides robustness checks that use the number_of_postsit in place of the 
craigslist_entryit variable for each of the four dependent variables described above.  The 
signs on the coefficient classifiedit * craigslist_entryit match the signs described in Tables 3 – 
6, and the results are significant in all cases except for that of log classified rates (p-value = 
0.25).      
5. Conclusions 
 
The foregoing sections provide evidence that newspapers with a classifieds editor 
were more likely to experience a decrease in classified ad rates, increase in subscription 
price, decrease in circulation share and decrease in display at rates following entry by 
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Craigslist.  The response matches the predictions from a simple model of a three-sided 
market.  The response is consistent with existing theoretical literature showing that an 
increase in competition can result in a decrease in price on one side of the platform and an 
increase in price on another side of the platform.   
We are able to take advantage of geographic and temporal variation in Craigslist’s 
entry patterns to employ an empirical design that helps to rule out alternative 
explanations.  While our empirical approach helps rule out a number of alternative 
explanations, a number of limitations remain.  For example, while we observe that 
newspapers with classifieds editors are more likely to experience a decrease in display ad 
rates, we cannot identify whether this is due to the decrease in newspaper subscribers, as 
suggested by our model, or due to some small display advertisers substituting away from 
higher priced display ads to simple online classified ads after Craigslist’s entry.  In any case, 
we expect the effect from the latter case to be very small.   
Perhaps more importantly, our approach so far has assumed that craigslist_entryit 
and εit are uncorrelated. The inclusion of market level fixed effects controls for 
unobservable characteristics of the market that might affect entry into that market.  
However, the assumption would be violated if there were unobserved changes to market i 
characteristics that affect entry into that market.  Our inclusion of time-varying, market-
specific variables such as the average number of ISPs and the number of other newspapers 
control for some of the likely alternative explanations.  We plan to further explore the 
robustness of our results in future work through two-stage econometric methods that 
predict Craigslist’s entry in the first stage. 
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It is worth noting that the peculiar nature of Craigslist’s corporate mission make the 
assumption on exogeneity of entry more plausible than if we were studying entry patterns 
of a typical profit maximizing firm.  Craigslist is incorporated as a for-profit company, but is 
not necessarily a profit maximizing company.  For example, it still uses the “.org” domain, 
whereas a for-profit company would typically use the “.com” domain.  The reason the 
company does so is that the “.org” domain “symbolizes the relatively non-commercial 
nature, public service mission, and non-corporate culture of craigslist.”14  In addition, the 
CEO Jim Buckmaster is self described as “anti-establishment, a communist, and a socialistic 
anarchist.”15  The fact that the company does not actively work to maximize profits is well 
documented in the press.  For example, in its annual ranking of top private digital 
companies, Silicon Alley Insider estimates that Craigslist generated about $150M in ad 
revenue in 2009, but could have generated at least $1B.16 Thus, given that the company 
does not try to maximize profits, it is plausible that Craigslist’s entry into newspaper 
markets is orthogonal to profit characteristics of the newspapers in those markets.  
In addition to providing a sharp empirical test of pricing theory for multi-sided 
markets, our study has broader implications for competition between different types of 
firms.  Our study helps build an understanding of how incumbent media platforms respond 
to technologically disruptive entrants from different industries.  This issue is important as 
the boundaries between media industries are blurred for many advertisers that can reach 
relevant consumers through a variety of media (e.g., radio, TV, and the Internet).   
 
                                                 
14 http://www.craigslist.org/about/factsheet, accessed May 22, 2010. 
15 http://www.craigslist.org/about/jim_buckmaster, accessed May 22, 2010. 
16 http://www.businessinsider.com/sai-50-2009#5-craigslist-5 Last accessed August 3, 2010. 
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Table 1: 
Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Log Classified Rate 2693 1.38 0.85 -2.21 4.96 
Log Annual Subscription Price 6761 4.84 0.40 1.81 6.22 
Circulation Share 7535 0.17 0.12 0.00 0.88 
Log Display Ad Rate 4864 3.48 0.88 1.62 6.35 
Dummy for Craigslist Entry 7820 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Dummy for Classified Editor 7820 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Number of Newspapers 7818 1.57 1.41 1.00 13.00 
Average Number of ISPs 6511 3.14 2.02 0.00 16.00 
Log Number of Posts 7747 0.96 2.76 0.00 12.60 
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Table 2: 
Comparison of Counties Entered or Not Entered by Craigslist.org 
Demographic Variable  Not Entered   Entered T-Test 
Poverty Rate 0.13 0.13 -0.67 
HS Drop Out Rate 0.16 0.16 -0.91 
Age 35.24 34.49 2.10 
Income 38119 38759 -0.87 
Population 526370 705557 -1.20 
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Table 3: 
Determinants of Log Classified Ad Rates (OLS Models) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable 
Classified 
Rate 
Classified 
Rate 
Classified 
Rate 
Classified 
Rate 
Classified 
Rate 
Craigslist Entry 0.028 0.139 0.134 0.136 0.132 
 
(0.063) (0.097) (0.100) (0.099) (0.101) 
Craigslist Entry*Classified 
 
-0.198* -0.187* -0.197* -0.187* 
  
(0.101) (0.106) (0.101) (0.106) 
Classified 
 
0.021 0.047* 0.021 0.047* 
  
(0.016) (0.024) (0.016) (0.024) 
Number of Newspapers 
 
0.143* 0.142* 0.143* 0.142* 
  
(0.077) (0.078) (0.078) (0.079) 
Average ISPs 
   
0.003 0.002 
    
(0.010) (0.010) 
  
     Newspaper Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies*Classified 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
Observations 2,682 2,682 2,682 2,682 2,682 
Number of Newspaper IDs 962 962 962 962 962 
Adjusted R-squared 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
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Table 4: 
Determinants of Log Price (OLS Models) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable Price Price Price Price Price 
Craigslist Entry -0.013 -0.028* -0.034** -0.024* -0.031** 
 
(0.011) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) 
Craigslist Entry*Classified 
 
0.033* 0.054** 0.022 0.048** 
  
(0.017) (0.022) (0.014) (0.019) 
Classified 
 
0.002 -0.009 0.008 -0.013 
  
(0.012) (0.028) (0.007) (0.011) 
Number of Newspapers 
 
-0.005 -0.005 -0.015 -0.016 
  
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Average ISPs 
   
-0.006* -0.007** 
    
(0.003) (0.003) 
  
     Newspaper Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies*Classified 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
Observations 6,758 6,758 6,758 5,688 5,688 
Number of Newspaper IDs 1,817 1,817 1,817 1,783 1,783 
Adjusted R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.08 
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Table 5: 
Determinants of Circulation Share  (OLS Models) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable Circ Share Circ Share Circ Share Circ Share Circ Share 
Craigslist Entry -0.004** 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.000 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Craigslist Entry*Classified 
 
-0.014*** -0.007** -0.012*** -0.007** 
  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Classified 
 
0.002 0.008*** 0.001 -0.006** 
  
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Number of Newspapers 
 
0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Average ISPs 
   
0.000 0.000 
    
(0.001) (0.001) 
  
     Newspaper Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies*Classified 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
Observations 7,534 7,534 7,534 6,261 6,261 
Number of Newspaper IDs 1,893 1,893 1,893 1,854 1,854 
Adjusted R-squared 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.10 
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Table 6: 
Determinants of Log Display Ad Rates (OLS Models) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable Ad Rate Ad Rate Ad Rate Ad Rate Ad Rate 
Craigslist Entry 0.021* 0.028* 0.036** 0.015 0.023 
 
(0.011) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) 
Craigslist Entry*Classified 
 
-0.015 -0.040** -0.015 -0.041** 
  
(0.017) (0.020) (0.017) (0.020) 
Classified 
 
-0.004 -0.019 -0.010 -0.005 
  
(0.008) (0.013) (0.009) (0.014) 
Number of Newspapers 
 
-0.022* -0.022* -0.026** -0.026** 
  
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
Average ISPs 
   
0.004 0.004 
    
(0.004) (0.004) 
  
     Newspaper Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies*Classified 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
Observations 4,846 4,846 4,846 4,060 4,060 
Number of Newspaper IDs 1,345 1,345 1,345 1,300 1,300 
Adjusted R-squared 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.05 
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Table 7 
Robustness Test: log Number of Posts instead of Craigslist Entry (OLS Models) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable Classified Ad Rate Price Circ Share  Display Ad Rate 
Num of Posts 0.012 -0.003* -0.000 0.003* 
 
(0.009) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) 
Num of Posts*Classified -0.011 0.005** -0.001* -0.005** 
 
(0.009) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002) 
Classified 0.002 -0.018 -0.007*** -0.023* 
 
(0.034) (0.018) (0.002) (0.012) 
Number of Newspapers 0.135 -0.015 -0.001 -0.026** 
 
(0.083) (0.012) (0.001) (0.013) 
Average ISPs -0.005 -0.007** 0.000 0.004 
 
(0.010) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) 
  
    Newspaper Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies*Classified Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,504 5,649 6,205 4,021 
Number of Newspaper IDs 903 1,776 1,847 1,291 
Adjusted R-squared 0.03 0.08 0.10 0.05 
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Figure 1: 
 
Atlanta Craigslist from February 2003. 
Source: http://web.archive.org/web/20030207142251/http://atlanta.craigslist.org/ 
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Figure 2: 
 
Chicago Craigslist from February 2003. 
Source: http://web.archive.org/web/20030205062029/http://chicago.craigslist.org/ 
 
